This research sheds light onto the effects of welfare policies on anti-immigration attitudes by focusing on qualitative differences in these policies over time. Previous studies provide little evidence that welfare policies affect levels of anti-immigration attitudes because they view the welfare state in an overly abstract manner in relation to attitudes toward immigration. From this viewpoint, this research focuses on differences in a specific aspect of welfare policies, i.e. labor market policies, according to level and type of activation. By analyzing cross-national data over time, we determine that labor market policies in the form of activation policies indeed affect attitudes toward immigration. We also show that the effects vary across different types of labor market policies and depend on individual levels of socioeconomic vulnerability. Thus, this article provides a first step to rethinking how we conceptualize the welfare state in relation to anti-immigrant attitudes.
Introduction
While many advanced societies witness the rise of anti-immigrant attitudes and supports for restrictive immigration policies, there is substantial cross-country variation (Bohman, 2011; Hjerm, 2007; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002; Schneider, 2008; Weldon, 2006; Wright, 2011) . Thus, many researchers investigate contextual factors that cause the cross-country variation. The vast majority of this research applies group threat theory.
Group threat theory assumes that the struggle over scarce resources generates threat and conflict between groups of people. For example, a minority population, or immigrants, is perceived to threaten the economic or cultural resources of the majority population, which will react negatively to this perceived threat. A vast number of studies (e.g. McLaren, 2003; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002) provide empirical findings that corroborate this theoretical standpoint. However, a minority population is not automatically threatening. The perception of threat depends on factors such as the minority population's visibility and the saliency of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in different contexts. A number of studies show that anti-immigrant attitudes are stronger when poor economic development interacts with a large population of immigrants (Quillian, 1995) and that increased levels of threat are expected if the economy worsens (Schneider, 2008) and/or if the number of out-group members increases (Scheepers et al., 2002) . Negative attitudes toward immigrants also depend on political factors, such as immigration and integration policies (Hjerm, 2007; Wright, 2011) , the visibility of anti-immigrant elites (Ivarsflaten, 2005) , and traditional party discourse (Bohman, 2011) , and more stable institutional features, such as citizenship regimes (Weldon, 2006) . Overall, it is evident that context is important in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes.
One such context is the welfare state, which is expected to influence such attitudes, as it is the basis for levels of redistribution of monetary resources, rights, and obligations toward the state and other members of society and provides the boundaries for inclusion and exclusion within society. The welfare state influences living conditions, cultivates political and social identity and trust, and forms means of civic engagement, for example (Crepaz, 2008; Wright, 2011; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005) . In other words, it creates the generalized form of solidarity within society.
However, previous literature found no systematic relationship between welfare policies and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (Crepaz, 2008; Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Ervasti et al., 2008; Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007) . We argue that this lack of relationship springs from an oversimplified understanding of the relationship and, correspondingly, the generalized manner in which the welfare state has been operationalized.
This research contributes to the literature on relationships between welfare policies and antiimmigration attitudes by advancing analysis in two important ways. First, we take detailed qualitative differences in welfare policies into account. We do not focus on the amount of social expenditure or general regime typologies; rather, similar to Jaeger (2006) and Wendt et al. (2011) , we focus on specific aspects of welfare states, namely, labor market policies. To be more specific, we focus on active labor market policies (ALMPs), which complement job losses through improving the employability of the unemployed rather than providing monetary support. We examine these policies, as they have become a significant policy option for welfare states since the early 1990s (Clasen and Clegg, 2006; Powell and Barrientos, 2004; Shin, 2000; Walters, 1997) . The activation of labor market policies is important in forming anti-immigration attitudes because the different policy designs of active and passive policies have different normative implications, which relate to the 'deservingness' of welfare recipients and thereby possibly affect anti-immigration attitudes. Thus, rather than using conventional welfare regime typologies, we focus on activation policies and measure the state's levels and types of activation.
Second, most previous studies, with some exceptions (Meuleman et al., 2009; Semyonov et al., 2006) , use cross-sectional datasets, which make it difficult to distinguish between the effects of policies and the effects of states. This is especially the case when researchers use welfare regime typologies as an indicator of welfare policies (Jaeger, 2006) . In such a case, the effects of policies and states are indistinct. To distinguish policy effects from state effects, we use a time-series dataset and include state fixed effects in the model.
In the next section, we present an overview of the theoretical framework and discuss how labor market policies influence public views of immigration. We first propose that the activation of labor market policies weakens anti-immigration attitudes, that is, support for restrictive immigration policies, by encouraging citizens to perceive that immigrants can contribute to the welfare state in a near future. Then, we propose that individual exposure to those labor market policies moderate these affects. We test these hypotheses using data from the six rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS 1, 2002; ESS 2, 2004; ESS 3, 2006; ESS 4, 2008; ESS 5, 2010; ESS 6, 2012) . The article concludes with a discussion of the impacts of activation policies on anti-immigration attitudes and the importance of exploring qualitative differences in welfare policies in research on the influences of such policies on citizens' attitudes.
Theoretical framework

Welfare states and anti-immigration attitudes
How institutions influence people is one of the main questions in sociological research. One way of explaining this relationship can be found in institutionalism theory. The latter assumes a reciprocal relationship between institutions and behavior (March and Olsen, 1989; Mau, 2004; Rothstein, 1998) . According to Mau, 'the inherent meanings of institutions provide motivations for individuals' actions and foster a commitment to the norms and values represented by the institution. Therefore, institutions determine not only what people find to be a rational course of action but also what seems to be justified and responsible from a moral point of view' (Mau, 2004: 60) . Institutions can ensure that certain issues are recognized as the responsibility of society and that other issues are consigned to the private domain. Institutions also suggest specific methods of problem solving and convey the appropriate reaction to a specific problem.
As an institution, welfare policies affect public attitudes through two mechanisms. On the one hand, they affect public attitudes by influencing a person's material interests. One of the important roles of welfare policies is decommodification, which refers to redistributing services and resources to enable the population members to sustain their lives without relying on the market (Esping- Andersen, 1990: 21-23) . In universal welfare states, characterized by high levels of decommodification and universal coverage, citizens can obtain sufficient resources to support their lives through welfare even if they lose their jobs. By contrast, in restrictive welfare states, characterized by low levels of decommodification and means-tested programs, it is difficult for citizens to obtain sufficient resources to support their lives without working.
On the other hand, welfare policies affect public attitudes by transmitting the embedded norms. The design of social transfer institutionalizes social relationships between members and groups of the society. Then, citizens use those norms as a point of reference when they consider the definition of a fair and equal society. More specifically, those norms frame the public view of 'who should be made equal to whom, or more precisely, who should have equivalent rights to what kind of collective protection ' (Arts and Gelissen, 2001: 285) . According to Van Oorschot (2000) , there are five criteria by which citizens evaluate who deserves welfare benefits, as follows: (1) control, whether people are responsible for their situations; (2) need, the extent to which people are in need; (3) identity, whether people can be regarded as 'one of us'; (4) attitudes, whether people are grateful for their support; and (5) reciprocity, whether and the degree to which people reciprocate. The public tends to view control, identity, and reciprocity as the most important criteria (Van Oorschot, 2000) .
The extent to which citizens regard welfare recipients as fulfilling these deservingness criteria depends on welfare policies. For example, means-tested programs in residual welfare states increase citizens' sensitivity to the issue of whether welfare recipients are in control of their situations and the extent to which they are in need (Crepaz, 2008; Rothstein, 1998) . Furthermore, such programs separate recipients from taxpayers by suggesting that 'they' (the recipients) live on 'our' (the taxpayers') contributions. In other words, the reciprocity and identity criteria are more difficult to fulfill in residual welfare states than in universal welfare states. By contrast, in universal welfare states, welfare benefits are available to the entire population, and recipients are not separated from taxpayers. In such systems, 'almost everybody contributes and almost everybody receives ' (Crepaz and Damron, 2009: 449) . Thus, citizens assume that welfare recipients fulfill the deservingness criteria.
If we focus on the former mechanism, we assume that citizens in universal welfare states or in states with large social expenditures have more positive attitudes toward immigration than those in residual welfare states or in states with small social expenditures. One reason for the former citizens' more positive attitudes is that they hold less fear of losing their jobs because they are highly decommodified. The second reason is that they feel less threatened by immigrants because welfare resources are less scarce.
If we focus on the latter mechanism, we can assume that an increase in immigrants is unwelcomed when the deservingness criteria are emphasized because newly arrived immigrants have difficulties fulfilling these criteria, as they have yet to contribute to the welfare system or to be viewed as belonging to native citizens' 'we' categorization. The latter is analogous to group threat theory (Blumer, 1958) where threat perceptions come from a sense of group position that is created and sustained by various contextual factors. Images of 'they' (out-group members) as a subordinate group as well as threats to majority prerogatives cultivate hostility toward the out-group. Welfare benefits are in this case prerogatives of the native citizens, which implies that the more deservingness is emphasized, the more anti-immigration attitudes increase. Immigrants are perceived as the least deserving group among various social groups, and more than one-third of supporters of basic income reject the distribution of such income to immigrants (Bay and Pedersen, 2006; Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007) . In short, residual welfare states increase the importance of deservingness more than universal welfare states, 1 which strengthens citizens' perceptions of immigrants as a threat to the welfare states more in residual welfare states than in the universal welfare states. Consequently, citizens hold stronger anti-immigration attitudes in residual welfare states than in universal welfare states.
Previous studies show no systematic relationship between welfare policies and general attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (Crepaz, 2008; Ervasti et al., 2008; Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007) . Research on the other aspect of this relationship, namely, the so-called progressive's dilemma research focusing on the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and support for the welfare state, also finds limited support for such a relationship (e.g. Brady and Finnigan, 2014; Burgoon et al., 2012; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Mewes and Mau, 2012) . A possible reason for the lack of substantial empirical findings in previous research on the welfare state and out-group attitudes is that we should take those results at face value. In other words, there are other forms of competition, such as cultural competition and struggles for identity, which have a greater association with perceived threat and drive anti-immigration attitudes (cf. Hjerm and Nagayoshi, 2011; Van der Brug et al., 2000) .
We do not deny that a number of contextual circumstances can influence anti-immigration attitudes. However, we argue that the lack of results in studies focusing on the relationship between the welfare state and anti-immigration attitudes might stem from the way that we traditionally understand and measure welfare policies. Previous studies focus on the quantitative differences in welfare policies or regime types while ignoring qualitative differences. Even if states allocate the same proportions of budget to social security, they might use the money in different ways, and these differences do not necessarily reflect the regime typology. To clarify the relationship between welfare policies and citizens' attitudes toward immigration, we use an approach that focuses on qualitative differences in welfare policies that might affect the deservingness criteria, namely, the levels of activation of labor market policies.
The activation of labor market policies and reciprocity criteria
We focus on labor market policies because anti-immigration attitudes are closely related to competition for job opportunities (Facchini and Mayda, 2009 ). Moreover, ALMPs have become one of the most utilized policy options in welfare states as a means of adjusting welfare policies to labor market conditions (Powell and Barrientos, 2004; Shin, 2000) . Previous studies might have been unsuccessful in capturing this change in policies, which may explain why they did not find that welfare policies affect anti-immigration attitudes.
Activation policy refers to social policies and programs 'aimed at promoting the (more or less obligatory) participation of people dependent on unemployment benefits or social assistance in work' (Van Berkel and Borghi, 2008: 332) , while passive policies complement job losses through monetary support such as unemployment benefits. The definition of activation policy written above covers a broader range of policies and programs than a narrow range of ALMPs, which include retraining, job placement, temporary financial assistance, and subsides or tax breaks to employers to encourage hiring (Kenworthy, 2010) . Activation policies include various policies, from enabling policies that improve the skills of the unemployed, such as training program and assistance with job placement, to negative incentives or punishments that force the unemployed to work, such as benefit limits and tightened eligibility (Kenworthy, 2010) .
The activation of labor market policies is important in the consideration of anti-immigration attitudes because it relates to the deservingness of welfare recipients. More specifically, the activation of labor market policies causes citizens to perceive that welfare recipients fulfill the reciprocity criteria by changing the conceptualization of welfare recipients. Active policies emphasize the obligation to work (Lødemel and Trickey, 2000) . Walters (1997) notes that active welfare policies invest in potential workers and assist them to invest in themselves, 'whether you are a mother, a disabled person, an early retiree -all of whom have previously been categorized as non-workers -the reasoning is that you are at the same time a potential worker' (p. 229). Specific programs that increase the employability of the recipients embody these norms. Participation in these active programs is not regarded as exercising one's rights but as fulfilling one's obligation (Lødemel and Trickey, 2000; Rosdahl and Weise, 2000; Walters, 1997) . From this viewpoint, we can assume that recipients of ALMPs are regarded as fulfilling the reciprocity requirement through participating in the policies. Although they are recipients of welfare policies, they are performing their duties and contributing to the future of the national economy by improving their employability. In other words, welfare recipients are less stigmatized where levels of activation of labor market policies are high because their participation in the active labor market programs itself contributes to fulfill the deservingness criteria.
In line with the assumed Americanization of European welfare states (e.g. Bommes and Geddes, 2000; Freeman, 1986; Wolfe and Klausen, 1997) , it is expected that anti-immigration attitudes are especially accentuated in societies where people perceive immigrants as abusers of rather than as contributors to the welfare state. In fact, Reeskens and Van Oorschot (2012) found that citizens are more reluctant to grant immigrants access to welfare benefits when they believe that welfare is allocated based on need rather than based on merit or equality.
Furthermore, the activation of labor market policies might also affect anti-immigration attitudes through the interest-based mechanism by changing the meaning of welfare benefits. If activation policies alter the meaning of welfare policies from rights to duties, citizens in a country with activation welfare policies are less likely to regard welfare benefits as scarce resources for which they must compete with immigrants in order to obtain. Therefore, we expect citizens in states where activation is predominant to feel less economic threat compared to citizens in states where passive policies are predominant.
From these viewpoints, we first investigate whether anti-immigration attitudes are influenced by the design of the welfare state. More precisely, we examine whether anti-immigration attitudes are stronger in welfare states where activation policies are less common.
However, we must take qualitative differences in activation policies into account. Although many countries implement activation policies to some extent, the designs and levels of activation differ across countries, and specifically coverage and replacement rate influence the implications of activation policies (Clasen and Clegg, 2006; Gallie and Paugam, 2000) . For example, in some countries, the implementation of activation policies along with large benefits is used to finance periods of training, which help equip the unemployed to compete for jobs. However, in 'workfare' policies, activation policies involve tightened conditions for the continued receipt of benefits (Clasen and Clegg, 2006) . These two activation policies are based on varying norms that differ in terms of the extent to which they remove citizens' economic vulnerability or the extent to which they differentiate welfare recipients from taxpayers. Therefore, they might have different impacts on anti-immigration attitudes. Thus, to capture different ideologies embedded in labor market policies, we must investigate the institutional arrangement of policies. More specifically, we must examine not only levels of activation but also the extent to which benefits and how the strictness of the eligibility of those benefits supports the unemployed. Ultimately, we will explore the effects of labor market policies while considering different activation policy designs.
The arguments above focus on the effects of labor market policies on citizens in general. However, previous studies suggest that labor market policies have different effects on different groups of people. Therefore, our second point of examination relates to personal experience with policies, and we will test whether possible effects of these experiences vary across welfare states. Previous research found that personal experience with a specific policy influences opinions about those policies (Hetling et al., 2008; Kumlin, 2002; Soss, 1999) . Research based on new institutionalism theory shows that proximity and visibility of policies are crucial for the relationship between policies and their public perception (Hetling et al., 2008; Soss and Schram, 2007) . If the impact of a policy reform is distant from citizens' lives, it has little impact on public perception. These studies suggest that the impact of welfare policies differs across citizens according to the citizens' proximity to the policies. In other words, participant status plays a significant role in the formation of one's views of the policy. The question is what type of effect should we expect?
Welfare policies have educative effects on their participants (Kumlin, 2002; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Soss, 1999) . The types of policy design 'affect people's experiences with the policy and the lessons and messages they take from it' (Ingram and Schneider, 1995: 442) , which affect people's attitudes. Previous studies found that participants of public assistance programs have lower political efficacy and lower satisfaction with welfare policies, compared to participants of a social insurance program or customers of public services (Kumlin, 2002; Soss, 1999) . Experiences with participation in welfare policies differ according to the type of policy, which form participants' views of welfare policies. For example, ALMPs tend to be associated with a greater improvement in the life satisfaction of the unemployed than passive labor market policies (PLMPs; Hansen et al., 2002; Wulfgramm, 2011) . This finding implies that ALMPs and PLMPs provide their participants with different experiences. Moreover, social benefits are a scare resource in passive welfare states and less so in active welfare states. From these viewpoints, we examine whether ALMPs affect participants' attitudes less strongly than PLMPs.
Data, method, and variables
Data and analytical method
The data come from the six rounds of the ESS (ESS 1, 2002; ESS 2, 2004; ESS 3, 2006; ESS 4, 2008; ESS 5, 2010; ESS 6, 2012) . Using the ESS instead of other cross-national public opinion surveys such as ISSP has some advantages for our purpose. It repeatedly asks about immigrants with the same questions in all six rounds, which enable us to do a time-series analysis. Furthermore, because our focus is on labor market policies, we need cross-national comparative measurement of the policies. In this regard, using the dataset including many European countries is efficient. The ESS involves strict random probability sampling of all persons aged 15 and older who reside in private households, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, language, or legal status. The samples are unevenly distributed across countries and years to some extent. We weighted samples so that the population or sample sizes of different countries do not affect the results (Ganninger, 2007) . We excluded non-citizens and those with an immigrant background from the analyses. After eliminating cases with missing data, the file contained 149,601 cases. 2 
Dependent variables
Our dependent variable is anti-immigration attitudes. The following three items are used: 'To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race and ethnic group as most of [country]'s people to come and live here?' 'What about people of a different race or ethnic group than most of [country]'s people?' and 'What about people from the poorer countries outside of Europe?' The possible answers range from 'allow many to come and live here' to 'allow none' on a four-point scale. We use the average score of the three items as an indicator of the respondents' level of anti-immigration attitudes. The pooled Cronbach's alpha for these three items is 0.89 (see Table 5 ), which indicates that the items measure the same dimension. 3 Like some research (e.g. Gorodzeisky, 2011; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Meuleman et al., 2009 ), we use antiimmigration attitude, that is, support for restrictive admission policies, as a dependent variable while some other research uses anti-immigrant attitude measured by perceived threat of immigration (e.g. Ervasti et al., 2008; Semyonov et al., 2008) . The dilemma between mass immigration and universal welfare states seems to result in supports for restrictive immigration policies (Banting, 2000; Faist, 1995) . Thus, it is important to examine whether one aspect of welfare policies, that is, labor market policies, strengthens or weakens support for restrictive immigration policies. Figure 1 shows how the average levels of anti-immigration attitudes differ across countries.
Contextual variables
We use three indicators of the activation of labor market policies. The first indicator is levels of activation of labor market policies. We use the 2-year average of total social expenditure on ALMPs as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and the 2-year average of the amount spent on PLMPs as a percentage of GDP. The division of policies into ALMPs and PLMPs is based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD, 1993) definitions. ALMPs include labor market training, subsidized employment, and special programs for youths and the disabled, whereas PLMPs include unemployment compensation and early retirement for labor market reasons. Although public employment services and other forms of publicly funded support for job seekers are included in ALMPs, data on social expenditures associated with the program are not available for several countries. Therefore, we do not include these programs in ALMPs. Data on the 2-year average (from a survey year and a year prior to the survey) amount spent on PLMPs and ALMPs as percentages of GDP are from the European Commission (2014c), except in the case of Switzerland, for which the data are from the OECD (2014a). We use a 2-year average because effects of economic conditions are expected to be delayed (Quillian, 1995; Schneider, 2008) . To capture levels of activation, we divide the amount of social expenditure on ALMPs by the amount of social expenditure on PLMPs. The second indicator is generosity of unemployment benefits, which is indicated by the net unemployment (including social assistance and housing assistance) replacement rate for two earnings levels, three family situations (single, one-earner couple, and two-earner couple), and 60 months of unemployment. The net replacement rate means to what extent unemployment benefits complement income levels when working. We measure this by the proportion of net income from work maintained after a job loss. The data are from the OECD (2014b) and is the 2-year average amount from the survey year and a year prior to the survey.
The third indicator is strictness of entitlement to unemployment benefit. It is difficult to measure strictness of entitlement; therefore, we examine the percentage of the unemployed who actually receive unemployment benefits. Although this is not a perfect indicator, it includes both contributory and non-contributory benefits. Data are from the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2014) . The ILO (2014) includes data from 2000, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. 4 We also control for the total amount of social spending for social protection benefits as percentage of GDP (2-year average from the European Commission (2014b)).
GDP, unemployment rate, and size of the foreign populations are included in the models as control variables because these indicators influence anti-immigration attitudes. Group threat theory assumes that under worse economic conditions, a group is more likely to perceive competition and, as a result, have more negative attitudes toward immigration. Furthermore, a greater number of foreign residents in a country leads to a greater perception of competition among the citizens living in that country, at least when combined with poor economic conditions. Per capita GDP and unemployment rate are the 2-year average of the survey year and year prior to the survey. The size of the foreign population is the 2-year average size of the foreign nationals of the survey year and year prior to the survey. Per capita GDP data come from the United Nations (2014), and data on unemployment rate and size of the foreign nationals come from the European Commission (2014a, 2014d).
Individual variables
Although the focus of this work is the effect of welfare policies on attitudes toward immigration, individual social conditions are also included in the analysis, as such conditions are not always evenly distributed across countries. We control for age, gender, level of education, occupational status, and subjective economic condition, 5 as these variables are known to affect anti-immigration attitudes. We separate occupational status into the following three categories: workers, the unemployed, and those who are not in the labor market. The answers provided for subjective economic condition range from 'living comfortably on present income' (= 1) to 'very difficult on present income' (= 4) on a four-point scale. Furthermore, we expect the activation of labor market policies to have a larger impact on those with personal experiences of labor market policies than their counterparts without such experiences. To examine the validity of this assumption, we include experience of long-term unemployment, as measured by an individual's experience of having been unemployed for a period of more than 12 months. 6 We treat the unemployed as a current status and the experience of long-term unemployment as two different variables. The former includes those who have been unemployed only for a short period at the time of the survey. The latter includes those who have experienced long-term unemployment but are employed at the time of the survey. Thus, we can differentiate the impact of personal experiences of labor market policies from the impact of social vulnerability as a current situation.
Results
Fuzzy cluster analysis for welfare policy typologies
We conduct a c-means fuzzy cluster analysis to cluster states according to levels and types of activation and then measure the membership of each state at each year to each cluster. Cluster analysis is a heuristic technique to explore patterns and dissimilarity, which is an effective way of capturing characteristics of welfare states (Powell and Barrientos, 2004) . A c-means fuzzy cluster analysis allows each observation to belong to different clusters at the same time by calculating the degree of membership of an observation x i to a cluster c k (g ik, 0⩽g ik ⩽1). A c-means cluster analysis calculates the degree of membership by minimizing J in the following equation
Here, N is the number of observation and k is the number of clusters. x i is an observation, and c k is the center of a cluster C k . Thus, x c i k − 2 is the distance between the observation and the cluster center, which is measured with Euclidean distances. Powers of m are an arbitrary value larger than 1. As the value increases, the membership of each observation to each cluster becomes fuzzier. In this analysis, m is set at 2. All the values of the observations are standardized. Using this method enables us to measure not only qualitative differences in welfare states rather than quantitative differences but also variations among states with the same type of regime. This point is important because welfare regime is an ideal type. Therefore, no states can be perfect representations (Jaeger, 2006 (Jaeger, , 2009 . Table 1 shows fit indexes of cluster validity of models with different numbers of clusters. It suggests that either the two-cluster model or the five-cluster model has high validity. Based on the Xie-Beni index, partition coefficient, and partition entropy, the two-cluster model shows the highest validity. However, according to the Fukuyama-Sugeno index, the five-cluster model shows the highest validity. Moreover, there is agreement that the effectiveness of the validity measures is similar, which implies that both the two-and five-cluster models can be used (e.g. Hashimoto et al., 2009) . We chose the five-cluster model because it captures differences in levels and types of activation. 7 Table 2 shows the cluster center of each cluster of the two-and five-cluster models. The twocluster model separates states into 'weak welfare states' characterized by low replacement rate and low coverage, and 'strong welfare states' characterized by high replacement rate and high coverage. There are only small differences in levels of activation between these groups. In the fivecluster model, clusters are separated into 'passive welfare states', 'weak welfare states', 'activation welfare states', 'restrictive welfare states', and 'workfare welfare states'. Their low replacement rate, low coverage, and low levels of activation characterize weak welfare states. Restrictive welfare states also show low levels of replacement, coverage, and activation. However, they have quite low coverage rate, which suggests that benefits are allocated to very limited populations. Passive welfare states have relatively high replacement rate, high coverages, and low levels of activation. By contrast, both workfare welfare states and activation welfare states show high levels of activation, with coverage and replacement rates being very low in the former type and very high in the latter type. It suggests that the latter states support the livelihood of the long-term unemployed, while the former states provide limited support. We use the degree of membership per state at each time point in the cluster as an indicator of typologies of labor market policies. Table 3 shows the cluster with the highest degree of membership of each state at each time point. We can see that the cluster with the highest degree of membership is in a specific type for many states in most time points, but there are some variations. For example, the highest degree of The results show that typologies of labor market policies are more complex than a simple conceptualization of active versus passive policies. Labor market policies differ not only in means of providing support (active/passive) but also in relation to levels of replacement (high/low) and coverage (limited/universal).
The question that arises is how do these different labor market policies affect anti-immigration attitudes? According to the previously reviewed studies, we expect citizens in activation welfare states to show less anti-immigration attitudes for two reasons. First, activation welfare states provide a robust safety net for citizens, reducing citizens' economic vulnerability. Second, activation welfare states do not largely stigmatize the welfare recipients. Due to activation welfare states' high coverage, separation between 'us' and 'them' is less visualized than in welfare states with low coverage. At the same time, because of these states' emphasis on activation policies, welfare recipients are more likely to be perceived as fulfilling the reciprocity criteria.
Concerning the other types of welfare states, the expectations are less straightforward and more exploratory. For example, the influences of a workfare welfare state are controversial. On the one (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , BE (2002 , CY (2002 CY ( -2012 , DE (2002 DE ( -2012 , ES (2006 ES ( , 2008 ES ( , 2010 FI (2002 FI ( , 2004 FI ( , 2006 ; FR (2004 FR ( , 2006 FR ( , 2008 FR ( , 2012 ; GB (2004 GB ( , 2006 GB ( , 2010 ; IE (2008 IE ( , 2010 IE ( , 2012 ; NL (2012); PT (2002 , 2004 , 2010 ) Weak BG (2010 ; EE (2010); GR (2002 GR ( -2012 , IT (2004 , 2010 ) Activation CH, DK, FI (2008 , 2010 FR (2002 FR ( , 2010 IE (2002 IE ( , 2004 IE ( , 2006 ; LU (2004 , 2010 NL (2002 NL ( , 2004 NL ( , 2006 NL ( , 2008 NL ( , 2010 ; NO (2004 NO ( , 2010 ; SE (2004 SE ( , 2006 SE ( , 2008 SE ( , 2010 hand, its embedded neoliberal norm might weaken anti-immigration attitudes (Freeman, 1986) . On the other hand, its low coverage might maintain stigmatized views of welfare recipients, and its low replacement rate does not alleviate the perceived economic threat of immigration. From this viewpoint, anti-immigration attitudes may be strong in a workfare welfare state compared to the other types, such as activation and passive welfare states.
Hierarchical linear model for anti-immigration attitudes
We use a hierarchical linear model to examine the effects of the labor market policies on antiimmigration attitudes. The hierarchical linear model is desirable because it provides an appropriate means of addressing sample bias related to the multilevel nature of the sampling design (Heck and Thomas, 2000) . A second advantage of this method is that it allows us to separate variation in the dependent variable into individual-and group-level variations, which enables us to estimate grouplevel effects while controlling for individual-level variation. By using a hierarchical linear model, we can show the impact of welfare policies (group-level variables) while controlling cross-national differences in average socioeconomic conditions, which seem to relate to both anti-immigration attitudes and welfare policies. Furthermore, because we utilize a time-series dataset, our group-level unit is a state year. Specifically, our model can be described using the following equations: x ijk is a value of an individual variable of individual i in state j at year k. z jk is a value of a group level variable of state j at year k. The equation shows that levels of anti-immigration attitudes vary according to the degree and type of activation of a specific state in a specific year. We add a random coefficient β jk to test our second aim, namely, to determine whether the effects of experiences of long-term unemployment differ according to the degree and type of activation of a specific state in a specific year. 
+
To distinguish between the effects of policy and the effects of a specific state (effects of living in a specific state), we add state fixed effects and year fixed effects into the model. Because the present research focuses on fixed effects rather than random effects, we use full information maximum likelihood estimation. Table 4 displays the results of the hierarchical linear analysis of attitudes toward immigration. The null model shows that approximately 11 percent of the variance in attitudes toward immigration is attributable to cross-national, cross-year differences (data not shown). Model 1 includes all individual-level variables as well as country and year fixed effects. This model shows that age, gender, level of education, occupational status, and subjective economic conditions have significant effects. Males, young people, and highly educated people have more positive attitudes toward immigration. Although the effect of gender is inconsistent with previous studies (e.g. Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009) , the effects are quite minor. Moreover, the effect of gender is commonly weak or non-existent in previous research, which means that even if the results are at odds with previous research, there could be chance and should be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, those who think that their economic conditions are harsh and those who are unemployed are less willing to support immigration. However, the experience of long-term unemployment does not have a significant impact on anti-immigration attitudes. Model 2 includes the variables of Model 1 and foreign populations, GDP, unemployment rate, and social expenditure. Foreign populations have a significant positive effect, while GDP and unemployment rate have no significant effect. Furthermore, social expenditure has significant positive effects, which is inconsistent with the findings presented in the existing literature (Crepaz, 2008; Ervasti et al., 2008) . These results suggest that if state fixed effects are controlled, antiimmigration attitudes increase when the total amount of social expenditure is large. Because universal welfare states such as Sweden have low levels of anti-immigration attitudes, effects of social expenditure might have been underestimated in previous studies. 8 The main aim of this study is to determine whether qualitative differences in labor market policies impact anti-immigration attitudes. We examine this question in Model 3, which includes levels and types of activation. Model 3 shows that in comparison with people in passive welfare states, those in activation welfare states have weaker anti-immigration attitudes. We can see that activation when a safety net is present weakens anti-immigration attitudes. However, there are no significant differences between passive welfare states and restrictive welfare states, workfare welfare states, or weak welfare states. This finding suggests that activation without a safety net, that is, workfare policies, does not have such effects. If we compare group-level variance, the activation variables explain 9.4 percent of the cross-national, cross-year variance unexplained by size of foreign populations, GDP, unemployment rate, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects (result not shown). Therefore, we can assume that levels of activation can partially explain the cross-national differences.
Models 4 and 5 examine interaction effects between welfare policies and experiences of longterm unemployment. Model 4 shows a positive significant interaction effect between total amount of social expenditure and experience of long-term unemployment. This result suggests that the anti-immigration attitudes of people who have experienced long-term unemployment increase more than those of people who have never had such experiences if a country's amount of social expenditure is increasing.
More importantly, Model 5 shows a significant negative interaction effect between experience of long-term unemployment and membership of all types of welfare states. The interpretation of this finding is that effects of welfare policies are much stronger for those with experiences of longterm unemployment than those without such experience. In other words, long-term unemployed people in passive welfare states are more likely to hold stronger anti-immigration attitudes compared to those in other types of welfare states. However, the interpretation that this effect is associated with experiences with policy is premature, as similar interaction effects exist between activation and education or occupational status. Thus, we cannot conclude that direct personal experiences with welfare policies affect citizens' attitudes toward immigration. A more plausible interpretation is that socioeconomic vulnerability moderates the effect of type and level of activation on anti-immigration attitudes.
Discussion and conclusion
This study examined the relationship between welfare policies and attitudes toward immigration. Previous research shows a limited relationship between the welfare state and attitudes toward immigration. We argued that the lack of findings might be due to the use of an overly broad definition and operationalization of the welfare state. Furthermore, previous studies use cross-sectional data that do not differentiate policy effects from state effects. We built upon previous research and examined whether qualitative differences of labor market policies, that is, levels and types of activation, affect anti-immigration attitudes using cross-sectional data over time. We assumed that these qualitative differences influence public views of deservingness. We also tested whether personal experiences with labor market policies have an impact and whether they were dependent on the activation policy.
Following the analysis of the cross-national time-series data, we found that labor market policies affect anti-immigration attitudes. People in welfare states that introduce activation of labor market policies with a robust safety net show more support for immigration than people in welfare states that emphasize PLMPs. These findings seem to reflect the norms embedded in the activation of labor market policies. ALMPs invest in potential workers and assist them in investing in themselves (Walters, 1997) . Therefore, citizens regard such beneficiaries as potential workers who will contribute to the future of the national economy. In this context, citizens are less concerned about the issue of reciprocity because every member in a society can be a contributor. This is important because reciprocity is a crucial criterion for judging 'who deserves what' in a welfare state, and immigrants tend to fail in satisfying this criterion (Van Oorschot, 2008) . Our results imply that in a country with highly activated labor market policies, citizens regard immigrants as potential contributors and thereby have positive views of immigration. By contrast, in a country that spends a large amount of the budget on PLMPs, people are less willing to accept immigration. The latter result indicates that passive welfare is associated with the view that a welfare state is a closed system. At the same time, activation policies without a robust safety net (workfare policies) do not alleviate anti-immigrant attitudes in general. Based on this result, we can assume that the emphasis on obligations to work is in itself not sufficient to alleviate anti-immigration attitudes. Previous studies suggest that means-tested welfare policies increase public perceptions of the eligibility of welfare recipients (Crepaz, 2008; Rothstein, 1998) . Thus, if a state emphasizes eligibility, citizens do not welcome more immigrants.
Moreover, we also showed that activation has larger impacts on those who have experienced long-term unemployment than on those who have not had such experiences. However, similar tendencies are found in attitudes of the lower educated and the unemployed. In other words, socioeconomically vulnerable citizens in a closed welfare system are more reluctant to welcome more immigrants even compared to those in weak and restrictive welfare states. The latter result leads us to conclude that it is likely that social exclusion in general, rather than the exposure to a specific system, is important.
In addition, by using time-series analysis with state fixed effects, we find that levels of antiimmigration attitudes rise when a state uses more social expenditures than average. It implies that generous welfare spending tends to strengthen support for restrictive immigration policies as assumed in previous studies (Banting, 2000; Faist, 1995) . There is, however, another possible interpretation. Although we controlled for levels of unemployment, large social expenditure might relate to other social changes like increase of elderly populations, which influence levels of antiimmigration attitudes. We need to investigate a mechanism through which social expenditure affects anti-immigration attitudes.
This research makes two clear contributions to our understanding of the relationship between welfare policies and public opinion. First, contrary to previous research, this study shows that welfare states are important. This is evident when we consider qualitative differences in welfare policies by examining the relationship between labor market policies and anti-immigration attitudes. As new institutionalism suggests, institutionally embedded norms seem to influence public opinion. While such norms influence the views of citizens in general, those who have experienced long-term unemployment or those who are socioeconomically vulnerable experience the strongest impact.
Second, this study helps explain how unique norms embedded in ALMPs influence public opinion. The introduction of ALMPs is often viewed as creating a crucial change in the nature of welfare policies. However, few studies have examined the impact of such changes on public opinion. This research suggests that ALMPs can frame the public view of immigration and that the effects differ according to whether those policies come with a robust safety net.
There are limitations of this research. The main limitation relates to indicators of welfare policies. ALMPs differ across countries. For example, Trickey (2000) places Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom in the same category of workfare policies based on similarities in their administrative frameworks. We scrutinize differences using three indicators: levels of activation, coverage, and generosity. However, these are not perfect indicators because we cannot measure negative incentives or punishments that force the unemployed to work, which is a prominent aspect of recent activation programs. Thus, we must scrutinize each policy to test how the differences between specific ALMPs affect anti-immigration attitudes. In addition to this point, we focus on group threat theory while placing little importance on other theories, such as contact theory (Allport, 1954) .
However, the results indicate that to disentangle the relationship between the welfare state and anti-immigration attitudes, we must rethink our definition of the welfare state and more precisely pinpoint the institutions and institutional arrangements that we theoretically expect to influence anti-immigration attitudes. This research has provided a first step in that direction.
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Notes
1. Larsen (2008) shows that people regard laziness as a cause of poverty more in residual welfare states than in universal welfare states. It suggests that people in residual welfare states concern about identity and control criteria than people in universal welfare states. However, relationship between welfare regime and citizens' emphasis on the deservingness is obscure in other studies (e.g. Van Oorschot, 2006 . 2. Data are weighted using design weight and population size weight. exclude respondents with more than 39 years of schooling. 6. Because we do not have information of respondents' actual experiences of participation in labor market policies, we use experiences of long-term unemployment as an indicator based on the assumption that experiences of long-term unemployment differ according to countries' levels of activation. Future studies can investigate whether participation in specific programs impacts anti-immigration attitudes. 7. Because Fukuyama-Sugeno index is sensitive to single anomalous values, it is probably best to choose the two-cluster model. However, these validity indexes generally assume that crisper partition is better than a fuzzier one (Antoniol et al., 2006) , which is not necessarily true for the purpose of the present research. Furthermore, the five-cluster model can capture differences between workfare states and activation states, which work best for the present research. Thus, we choose the five-cluster model. 8. In fact, if we exclude state fixed effects, there is no significant effect of social expenditure. 
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